

## Vision for the Future:

### Building Capacity for a More Sustainable World

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#### *State of the World*

Over the past fifty years, the world as a whole has made undeniable, and often quite dramatic, “progress” on many fronts. People in scores of countries have attained unprecedented levels of health, wealth and knowledge. Diseases that were for millennia the scourges of whole nations have been conquered. Food production has grown to levels unimagined even a few decades ago. An ever growing range of products from industry is accessible to an ever growing range of customers. And cheap sources of energy have made possible facilities for travel and communication that enable large numbers of people to acquire knowledge and live a life of convenience and comfort on a scale never known before.

However, the flip side of this development coin presents a very different tale. The forests, rivers and soils of large parts of the world have experienced greater and more rapid deterioration in the past few decades than they had over the preceding thousands of years. Species are becoming extinct at a rate that is rapidly approaching levels comparable to those of the mass extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs. Climate change caused by human activity is now one of the top items on the international agenda. These pressures on the Earth’s natural resources have been extensively documented in The Environmental Data Reports of the UN Environment Programme and by other international agencies.

The negative impacts of “development” are not confined to environmental issues alone. There is perhaps more alienation today – with the accompanying proliferation of drugs, crime and violence, often manifested as acts of terrorism and ethnic aggression which are the daily subjects of newspaper headlines all over the world. More pervasive – though possibly less visible – is the deprivation left behind by the process of development: poverty, hunger, vulnerability, indebtedness and rapid population growth. UNDP’s annual Human Development Report presents data showing the decline of social capital, particularly in developing countries, and the alarming growth in economic disparities throughout the world.

Much of the “progress” we have made has, thus, been achieved at the expense of natural and social capital which have diminished precipitously as a result. Unprecedented creation of wealth has gone hand in hand with unprecedented expansion of poverty.

International recognition of the gravity of these issues was first expressed in the convening of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm in 1972, which engendered a two decade long series of world conferences on environmental and social issues culminating in the Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The decade since the Earth Summit has continued to witness a growing international debate on these and related issues, including the Millennium Summit in New York in 2000. The World Summit on Sustainable Development, to be held in August 2002 at Johannesburg, is the next step in the long process adopted by the international community to identify emerging global problems and to design viable solutions for them.

### *Evolution of Development Theory*

During the more than five decades of international development cooperation, multilateral and bilateral agencies have spent large amounts of money in the hope of accelerating the expansion of developing country economies. The resources mobilized by the recipient countries themselves for this effort were even larger, often by one or two orders of magnitude. Yet, with a few exceptions, of the countries that had large populations living below the poverty line at the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War the bulk are still poor today. Worse, many of them now face the double jeopardy of having lost a large part of their natural and social capital as well.

Much of this “development” effort was influenced by theories of societal change formulated within the discipline of neoclassical economics. These theories, which at any given time largely reflected the doctrines prevailing in the Bretton Woods institutions, have evolved through many cycles over this period. Unfortunately, they have rarely been enriched by a larger understanding of societal, cultural and political processes – a shortcoming that has in many cases led to failure, sometimes total failure, in achieving their stated goals.

Starting around 1950 and fortified with the theories of underdevelopment, such as those of Rosenstein-Rodan, and of the staged evolution of economies, such as those of Gerschenkron and Rostow, armies of expatriate consultants went forth to help transform the economies of the poorer regions of the world. In the early days, the emphasis of the policies and interventions they advocated was, in the manner suggested by economists such as Harrod and Domar, largely on increasing savings rates and improving the productivity of industrial capital. Other consultants, such as those who followed the theories of Lewis, promoted investments in industry as a means of creating higher incomes among urban elites whose savings could in due course be expected to trickle down to the poor in the other, mostly agricultural, economy. Still others pursued the theories of economists such as Myint, Haberler and Viner, focusing on international trade as the engine of development.

Some (eg, Prebisch, Singer, Baran, Sweezy, and Amin) advocated more government intervention, others (eg, Bauer, Little, Balassa, Krueger and Johnson) strongly urged less. Some advocated highly centralized planning systems, others believed in more or less complete laissez faire. All of them had powerful, if not flawless arguments to support their theses. And all of them had numerous, loyal disciples working out in the field.

Welfare economists such as Little, Adelman, Lal, Marglin and others, devised methods to evaluate the time streams of benefits and costs entailed by a proposed development activity. They also evolved rudimentary techniques for quantifying social and environmental variables that could in principle be included in project decision-making. Such benefit-cost analyses, even though they often had to be based on somewhat unrealistic assumptions regarding discount rates and shadow prices, were widely recognized to be better than no analysis at all and became quite fashionable for appraising development projects.

A few economists, including Seers, Chenery, Singer, Sen, Ul-Haq, Streeten, Daly and Henderson, questioned the heavy reliance of development theory on purely growth-related factors. Some of them went further and tried to include issues of equity and social welfare in their decision models. But most of these attempts did not get incorporated into mainstream development practice.

### ***Evolution of Development Praxis***

Emerging from long and sometimes painful colonial experiences, the host countries had their own optics of national interest and chose from a wide spectrum of economic and political frameworks that ranged from Marxist and socialist on the left to outright capitalist on the right. Often, to raise financial capital for their development plans, they had to accept the advice of external policy consultants and adopt development models that were at significant variance with their own policies. The results, in a large part of the developing world, were highly confused and quite dysfunctional economic interventions, often lacking in coherence and occasionally leading to mutually countervailing outcomes, stagnant economies and social conflict.

In the course of the next three or four decades, the developing world thus went through a rapid succession of fashions in economic policy. First there was import substitution. When that did not show adequate results, export promotion (mainly of primary commodities and rudimentary industrial goods) took over. And when neither of these worked, the neo-liberals became more dominant with their advocacy of greater emphasis on international trade. Five Year Plans for capital investments were common during this period. Substantively, the precise sequence of emphasis varied from country to country but in many it went from

core industries to infrastructure to agriculture to industry to trade. In some it went the other way.

This phase was followed by a shift into strengthening physical infrastructure and financial institutions. And, in parallel to these, there was the constant refrain calling for structural adjustments in monetary and fiscal policies and for privatization of the ownership of productive assets. In many cases, this was followed by imposition (for example, as conditionality for obtaining financing from multilateral institutions) of fiscal measures such as reducing social expenditures to balance national budgets or lowering of tariff barriers to improve the competitiveness of national industries in global trade. More recently, international donors have also expressed increasing concern for issues of “good governance”, participative decision-making and greater involvement of civil society in development planning. The role of centralized economic planning gradually withered away, though in many countries the bureaucracies in charge of this function continue to remain in place.

A parallel trend in recent years has been the gradual realization of a need for investing in social capital such as health and primary education. There also appears to be increasing interest in strengthening local economies through the creation of livelihoods and provision of microcredit. However, these trends remain somewhat marginal: the growth of these types of development intervention is, perhaps, limited by the fact that neither government nor big business has any comparative advantage in providing them.

Throughout this period, the main actors in the design and implementation of development programmes were seen to be government and the public sector, gradually over time giving way to the private sector and, more specifically, corporate businesses. Civil society was seen to be a good ally for carrying out surveys, creating awareness and undertaking “social mobilization”, but not for much else.

Yet, the economies of most developing countries are not where, by any objective measure, they should be after so many decades of thoughtful effort. Even the World Bank, the champion of cutting edge thinking on development economics admits that these theories and approaches have not worked satisfactorily.

There is, undoubtedly, some truth and possible value in all such theories. But a national economy is a complex system and the world within which it operates is a system of even greater complexity. For most poor countries, development means transforming a highly inefficient, inequitable and imbalanced economy operating at a low level of transactions to one that is growing rapidly, equitably and sustainably. To succeed in bringing about sustainable development, the interventions must match the complexity of the problems they

have to deal with. Often, the approaches listed above have not been able to deliver such interventions.

### ***The Context of Development Planning and Implementation***

Experiences with planning and implementation of development programmes differ, of course, from country to country. There have certainly been projects over the years that can be counted, by any standards, as success stories. However, there are many others that cannot, and it is important that the international community derive whatever lessons it can to enable it to design more effective strategies for the future.

A few generalizations are possible regarding some of the basic attributes of development programmes as practiced through much of the developing world. There exists a broad consensus, based on analysis of numerous development projects, that a large part of past development activity can be characterized as being:

**By and through Governments:** In most developing countries, the responsibility for planning and executing action for national development rests almost entirely with governments, public sector organisations and external agencies employed by the government. This often leads to inappropriate design of development action and assignment of inappropriate roles, government taking responsibility for activities better done by others.

**Top down:** This means that decisions are often made and legitimized without adequate participation of the people affected by them.

**Narrowly Sectoral:** Designed as projects (see below), most development activity ends up by having a narrow, short-term focus, often in conflict with the requirements of sustainable development.

**Inflexible:** Organised and executed by bureaucratic systems that are heavily constrained by poor professional motivation, fear of innovation, aversion to risk, the tyranny of rigid budget lines and the artificial deadlines of financial year-ends, it becomes difficult to introduce much imagination into development projects.

**Externally driven:** Because of both the inadequate availability of local expertise, and the plentiful availability of external funding, many governments have relied heavily on expatriate consultants to formulate their economic development plans.

Moreover, such development activities almost never leave behind:

**Local ownership of assets:** If the local “beneficiaries” have not contributed to the design or implementation of development action, it is only understandable that they are often alienated from the results – which they sometimes proceed to undermine or not use.

**Capacity for the future:** When there is little involvement of local people or sense of ownership among them, there is little possibility for building up local capacity to innovate, incubate or multiply solutions for their remaining needs.

### ***The Project Mode of Implementation***

No matter what the conceptual basis of development policy is at any time, most development action, particularly that funded by overseas sources, is implemented in the form of projects. This, in itself is not always or necessarily undesirable. The project is an excellent, logical framework for achieving stated goals. A well designed project clearly defines the outputs expected and the inputs, in terms of money, resources and time, needed. Before starting, or even before a decision is made to undertake the project, the outputs and inputs can be appraised to determine the worthwhileness of the project. During implementation, the project documentation helps different actors dovetail their contributions efficiently and effectively. Well executed projects can provide for a high level of transparency and accountability, both essential in any development activity.

Despite the demonstrated value of the project as a means of working towards development goals, however, and the long-standing reliance of most development agencies on it, one must also recognize the limitations of this approach. Some of these limitations can, unfortunately, pose severe barriers to the attainment of goals critical to making development sustainable. Whether these limitations are general -- inherent and integral to the project as a device for implementation -- or are specific to a project – for example, simply the result of poor project formulation -- they are so pervasive that one must accept them as inseparable from the very idea of a project.

Although the project mode of implementation is highly amenable to participative decision making, it is often carried out by governments and businesses in a way that is seen to be autocratic and arrogant. This can reduce the value of both its outcome and its impacts significantly.

Even with the sophisticated quantitative techniques evolved by welfare economists to include an ever wider array of benefits and costs in the appraisal of projects, actual calculations are subject to a wide range of interpretations. At the heart of the calculations lies the discount rate, which is supposed to reflect the time preference of consumers and producers for the benefits they receive from the project. Given the nature of the exponential function used in such

calculations, it turns out that no realistic discount rate can at the same time reflect the imperatives of sustainability. Any discount rate that could be chosen is either too low for the consumer or too high for nature. This means in practice that benefit-cost analysis almost always overvalues the immediate economic benefits of a project and undervalues the environmental, social and other costs, particularly in the long run.

With all their advantages, for certain purposes projects suffer from severe limitations. As mentioned above, their reliance on centrally conceived, highly focused, narrowly designed processes can help achieve results – but not always of the kind needed. For sustainable development, longer time horizons and more intangible side benefits are needed than can usually be addressed by projects.

### *Limits of Current Development Strategies*

Although not everyone would necessarily agree with each detail, there appears to be a widespread perception that the outcomes of current development strategies are not commensurate with the inputs that have gone into them. Among the shortfalls, the most commonly mentioned are:

**Implementation gap:** Even when development projects achieve their output targets, a large proportion never achieve the full impacts they were designed for.

**Accountability gap:** The mechanisms for holding project authorities responsible for achieving their goals are weak, primarily because the local stakeholders are not adequately involved or do not have the requisite watchdog skills.

**Continuity gap:** Development projects intended to have long term continuity often wind down or close up once the project funding comes to an end.

**Replicability/scalability gap:** Development programmes that serve as exemplary models which are adopted by others for replication and scaling up are not as common as should be expected, given the quality of resources that go into their planning and implementation.

**Multiplier gap:** Real economic transformation occurs when development activity leads to leveraging positive impacts outside its own domain – and yields positive side benefits which produce multipliers that can resonate through the economy. Projects in the past have often led, on the contrary, to negative impacts on the environment and to disruptions in traditional practices that previously were at least viable.

**Sustainability gap:** Most development projects are based primarily on economic criteria and often have negative, unintended consequences on social and environmental issues which could have been avoided or minimized through

proper consultation with the stakeholders. In any case, despite extensive development effort, inequity and injustice, marginalization and social exclusion continue to remain at unacceptably high levels and the quality of the environmental resource base is heading toward unacceptably low ones. In addition to these, there are some opportunities, crucial to building the *capacity* of a society to design its own future, often missed by international development initiatives, leading to missing links in society such as:

**Technology gap:** Development programmes, particularly those that are largely driven by external consideration often lead to inappropriate technology choices and considerable waste of capital resources. Often their biggest failure is to leave behind little or no “technicity”, or the ability to master technology and appropriate it for use suited to local needs and resources.

**Institutional gap:** Although development programmes have occasionally led to the establishment of effective institutions for innovation, incubation and delivery of solutions, the achievements over the past fifty years falls far short of what is needed.

**Leadership gap:** Perhaps the greatest failure of international development is its poor record in build local leaders who can help their societies make informed decisions and design development strategies more in tune with their own aspirations and resource endowments. Rather, in many places it appears to have contributed to an acceleration of the opposite process, the brain drain.

### ***Need for Evolving Better Development Approaches – Building Capacity***

Given the significant gaps described above between the expectations from 50 years of international development practice, and the actual outcomes, it was only natural that by the early 1990s there would be a growing demand for new approaches to development. This demand grew in urgency as the imperatives of competing in a rapidly globalizing economy became apparent in even the poorest countries. And, with worldwide communications beginning to bring new messages to every home, creating rising expectations for such values as better quality of life, participation and environmental management, this demand became increasingly widespread and pressing. By the time of the Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro, there was a broad-based concern among both donors and recipients that international development strategies needed to be redesigned.

Out of the Rio process came an understanding that, in addition to redesigning conventional, project based development activities to close the gaps identified above and make them more sustainable, much more emphasis is needed on a particular new form of development cooperation: *the building of local capacity*. One of the results of this recognition was the inception of the

Capacity 21 Programme, responsibility for implementing which was given to UNDP.

Simply defined, “Capacity” is people who have the ability, backed by the decision systems and infrastructure they need, to identify, formulate and analyse the problems of high relevance to their societies and design effective strategies to solve them. To be effective, such capacity needs to be built up in all sectors of society – government, business, academia, media, civil society – with opportunities for strong collaborative experiences leading to a tradition of dynamic interaction among them. To play its fullest role, capacity in this sense has to be built up at all levels of society: the national, provincial and local. It is only when a local community acquires capacity to design and create its own future that genuine development can take place. Basically, capacity is synonymous with leadership, informed leadership in all walks of life.

A country or a community with the requisite capacity should be able to choose among different technology options and adopt those most appropriate for local markets and conditions. Capacity also enables societies to implement solutions and learn lessons from experience so as to redesign future solutions even more effectively. Above all, capacity is needed in each country to recognize issues of self-interest, advocate more sustainable policies and negotiate effectively in bringing these about.

In time, capacity grows with the building of institutions and infrastructure and is reinforced by infrastructure of all types – social, physical, financial and communication.

### ***The Capacity 21 Programme of UNDP***

With its Capacity 21 Programme, UNDP set out to assist Developing Countries and Countries in Transition achieve their goals of sustainable development. It was established as an integral part of Agenda 21, the sustainable development strategy agreed at the Earth Summit in 1992 and has, in fact, been UNDP’s main instrument for implementing Agenda 21.

The task assigned to the Capacity 21 Programme was, thus, to undertake systemic programmes in selected countries to build the capacity of local institutions to integrate economic, social and environmental issues into the development process at the national, provincial and local levels.

This meant that Capacity 21 initiatives were to help local institutions and experts design strategies with longer time horizons that lead to development multipliers by creating public awareness and potential for meaningful participation in decision making. It was recognized that this would mean strengthening the ability of partners to deal with increasingly complex, “harder” issues such as

those concerned with technology, innovation, structures of governance, economic and trade issues and to design new development strategies that are more appropriate to local needs. It would also mean encouraging national counterparts to confront vested interests, attack business-as-usual mindsets and evolve strategic alliances with others working towards the same overall goals, not always easy tasks for an international agency to undertake.

At the national and local level, Capacity 21 recognised it would have to work to create a new cadre of people with a sense of national purpose, a sense of excellence and a sense of commitment. In order to achieve this, it would have to work with them to evolve better understanding of the inter-relationships between economic, social and environmental issues such as the poverty – population – marginalisation cycles and the pitfalls and opportunities offered by emerging issues such as global change, CDM, trade and WTO. At the local level, Capacity 21 programmes would have to address such issues as empowering the marginalised, particularly women, and the need for participation and building up a sense of ownership among communities.

To achieve these objectives, Capacity 21 set out to evolve methodologies in unfamiliar territories such as the integration of planning processes across sectors (horizontal) and between levels of government (vertical); across space (geographical); and across time (intergenerational). It supported the participation of a diverse range of stakeholders to ensure that all interests in society are represented in the identification of needs, prioritization and implementation of planning objectives; and it encouraged information sharing across sectoral departments, between levels of government and a broad range of stakeholders, for more comprehensive and integrated planning.

In all its initiatives, Capacity 21 endeavoured to nurture processes that were country-owned and country-driven – taking every opportunity to rely on local responsibility and local decision making. It championed integrated, cross-sectoral approaches to poverty reduction and to environmental and resource management. Its key, guiding principles were clearly stated: promoting systemic approaches to development through integration, participation and use of reliable information and by building long-lasting human and institutional capacities.

### ***What makes Capacity 21 different from regular development programmes?***

Capacity 21 is not the only international development programme dedicated to integrated, systemic approaches to sustainable development through the building up of national and local capacity. Since the Earth Summit a number of other donor agencies have instituted programmes with similar overall goals.

UNDP itself has operated the Small Grants Programme on behalf of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) for the past ten years. In addition, GEF has the Medium Sized Project fund largely for this purpose. The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation also manage several capacity building Trust Funds on behalf of various bilateral donor agencies, including those of Japan and the Netherlands.

Several bilateral agencies, including the SDC (Switzerland), DFID (UK) and JICA (Japan) have significant capacity building funds, many of them operated through host country intermediaries.

Sizable capacity building funds are also available from International and National NGOs and from Foundations. Indeed, some foundations such as Rockefeller, Ford, MacArthur and others were pioneers in this field and were providing what were essentially capacity building funds long before the Earth Summit.

Nevertheless, the Capacity 21 Programme of UNDP is, in some ways unique in that it has provided not only financing for capacity building but also extensive and very effective backstopping services to support it. In this manner, it has been able very actively to facilitate participatory processes and catalyse the inner potential of local communities.

### ***What has Capacity 21 achieved?***

A detailed evaluation of Capacity 21 is presented in Chapter 2. Here, we give a brief overview of the issues it has handled over the decade of its existence, of some of its larger successes and failures and of its contribution to the theory and praxis of international development cooperation.

It is the unanimous opinion of the Evaluation Team that Capacity 21 as a programme has made major contributions to the goals of sustainable development in many countries, despite having had to work with quite severe budgetary and institutional handicaps throughout its existence.

In many of its partner countries, it has been able to help create some degree of understanding of the need for holism in dealing with the complexity of sustainable development issues. It has been even more effective in promoting flexible, responsive and yet systemic systems for development planning, both at the national and the community levels. It has had some success in enabling the establishment of horizontal and vertical linkages within governments and across sectors. It has been able to foster distinct attitudinal change and new ways of thinking about sustainable development issues, in large part by helping to create a sense of ownership among communities and individuals. It has been unusually

successful in creating multipliers for its impacts by emphasizing the need to empower people, particularly women, minorities and the marginalized.

We have seen ample examples of the results of the Capacity 21 Programme and noted a wide variety of direct and catalytic impacts on the ground. There are many instances of new awareness created among the public and skills and sensitivity generated among development practitioners throughout the regions where the Programme has been in operation. Political support has been generated for the concept of capacity building and this has even led to some institutional, legal and other changes to enable this to happen. Most striking, perhaps, is the number of cases where the Programme has led to the introduction of integrative approaches and the changes implied by these in the paradigms of development held by people.

These are no mean achievements for a programme that has operated, for most of its existence, under quite severe and adverse conditions. For much of its life, it never had the luxury of guaranteed continuity of operations. Its personnel often worked under considerable uncertainty. Its planning and budgeting were constantly hampered by the unfulfilled promises of donors and poor support from its constituencies, both within and outside UNDP. It never occupied a very central position within the overall constellation of UNDP's preoccupations and, ironically did not benefit much from the broader decentralisation process, which for Capacity 21 was only partial.

Perhaps its somewhat peripheral position within the bigger organization acted partly to its advantage. It was largely left alone to pursue its goals to promote systemic change and to work with its country partners to demonstrate principles rather than get bogged down with on-the-ground specifics. Out of view of mainstream management, it could be more than usually innovative and take risks unhampered by having to address the normal turf or vested interests. These same factors may have also enabled the Programme to mobilize untapped resources and support and to utilize its resources more effectively than would otherwise have been the case.

At the same time, it is to the credit of the global Capacity 21 team that it managed to mobilize partnerships and produce high quality outputs with its limited resources. It was able, over the years, to overcome the natural resistance that comes from entrenched mindsets to promote wholly new and unfamiliar approaches to development in a variety of development contexts and cultures. Inside UNDP, it overcame its somewhat peripheral location within the organisational hierarchy to garner considerable management support and some financial resources. Where it did not have the means to bring about direct change, it opted for and often successfully adopted catalytic approaches.

The impacts of the Capacity 21 Programme are certainly net positive – and significant. It has created visible, durable and replicable results and

demonstrated the potential for multipliers in the capacity building approach to development cooperation. Its costs for achieving these results were quite limited, ironically in part because of the low importance given to the Programme in UNDP and the consequent underexpenditure on personnel, travel and other resources. In terms of both cost efficiency and programme effectiveness, Capacity 21 must rank high among recent programmes in the UN system.

At the same time, it must be admitted that thus far, Capacity 21 can only be considered as a kind of Pilot, or more correctly, a collection of pilots, which it became of necessity for lack of resources to achieve a full rollout. As such, it has very successfully demonstrated on many fronts the potential of the capacity building approach. UNDP should certainly be encouraged to relaunch it in a new and much strengthened incarnation.

### ***Beyond Capacity 21 – A Vision for the Future***

The experiences of Capacity 21 offer many valuable lessons for the future. First, that fundamental change is needed to make development processes sustainable and such change is possible.

Second, there exist effective and powerful development strategies that do not necessarily follow existing approaches. Examples include: greater reliance on local initiatives involving people to people interaction; emphasis on institutions and decision processes rather than on hardware; and the value of alliances among government, public agencies, civil society and other sectors.

Third, there are no short cuts to sustainable development but the process can be speeded up by using the type of process used by Capacity 21, involving a succession of stages from Demonstration to Validation to Institutionalisation to Multiplication.

The evaluation of Capacity 21's performance persuades us of the merits of such an approach, despite the limitations under which it has had to operate. We strongly recommend that the Programme be continued and strengthened, with the understanding that, to succeed, any such programme will need:

- a critical mass of financial and other resources
- a reasonable gestation period
- genuine decentralization
- integration with other sustainable development programmes

Such an initiative would offer considerable advantages for UNDP, which could capitalize on the foundations already established. Given the current trends in international cooperation, it could well become central to the organisation's future. It would be an effective means for leveraging other programmes and multipliers and provide new ways to strengthen institutional impact. It would act

as an excellent channel of feedback and learning for the organisation, and as a channel for professional growth and fulfillment for its personnel.

It has not escaped us that Capacity 21 also offers significant benefits for participating Governments, with impacts it has already demonstrated in the Pilot phase: confidence building, skills for strategic planning, integration and cross-sectoral strategies, value of transparency and information and the importance of people's participation in designing and implementing sustainable development interventions.

Others who can take advantage of a fully operational Capacity 21 programme include multi/bilateral development assistance agencies who will find valuable lessons on making their programmes more systemic, holistic and long-term; and business, media, universities and the civil society – all of which can find new opportunities for partnerships with each other and the government.

The only major caveat we can offer is that a higher degree of accountability is needed from all the actors involved, not least UNDP in providing the necessary linkages and support; donors and funding sources in delivering on promises and providing continuity; and on partner countries in fulfilling their counterpart responsibilities.